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Abstract
In a common-values election with continuously distributed information quality, the
incentive to pool private information con￿ icts with the swing voter￿ s curse. In equi-
librium, therefore, some citizens abstain despite clear private opinions, and others vote
despite having arbitrarily many peers with superior information. The dichotomy be-
tween one￿ s own and others￿information quality can explain the otherwise puzzling
empirical relationship between education and turnout, and suggests the importance
of relative information variables in explaining turnout, which I verify for U.S. primary
elections. Though voluntary elections fail to utilize nonvoters￿information, mandatory
elections actually do worse; e⁄orts to motivate turnout may actually reduce welfare.
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11 Introduction
In every democracy, a large fraction of eligible citizens abstain from voting in public
elections. Many of those who do vote participate in some but not all races on the ballot￿ a
phenomenon known as roll-o⁄. Low and declining turnout are commonly viewed as threats
to democracy. One important reason that is frequently given for not voting is that citi-
zens lack con￿dence in their understanding of political issues, or their knowledge of political
candidates. Consistent with this, Matsusaka (1995) ￿nds that, empirically, participation in
U.S. elections is highest among demographic groups that are likely to be well-informed, such
as those who are well-educated, older, married, publicly employed, or recently contacted by
campaign workers; and low among people who have recently moved. Wol￿nger and Rosen-
stone (1980) ￿nd education, in particular, to be the single best predictor of voter participa-
tion, and subsequent research (Dee, 2004; Milligan, Moretti, and Oreopoulos, 2004) ￿nds this
relationship to be causal. Bartels (1996), Degan and Merlo (2007a), and Larcinese (2006)
link voting more directly with information quality per se, and Lassen (2005) concludes that,
controlling appropriately for information, education does not otherwise in￿ uence turnout.
Similarly, Strate et al. (1989) argue that age in￿ uences turnout predominantly because
life experience develops "civic competence". Wattenberg, McAllister, and Salvanto (2000,
p. 245) also ￿nd information to be "the most signi￿cant factor in explaining the roll-o⁄
phenomenon".
To explain the connection between information and voting, Matsusaka (1995) points out
that a citizen who is uncertain which of two candidates she1 prefers expects a lower bene￿t
from voting. As Feddersen and Pesendorfer (1996; hereafter FP) point out, however, this
logic leads to abstention only when voting is costly (since the expected bene￿t of voting
is always positive, even for a poorly informed voter), which is not always the case. As
an alternative, they identify a strategic incentive for abstention which they call the "swing
voter￿ s curse." In their model, voters share common underlying values, so that disagreements
arise only because of informational di⁄erences; if information were perfect, voting would
be unanimous. Informed citizens observe which candidate is superior, and vote for that
candidate. An uninformed citizen, uncertain which candidate is better, instead abstains￿
even when voting is costless, and even if prior beliefs favor one candidate over the other￿
reasoning that her own vote will in￿ uence her payo⁄ only if it is pivotal (i.e. either making
or breaking a tie), which can only happen when she is voting against the informed voters
and therefore for the wrong candidate. Thus abstention is actually the best way for an
uninformed citizen to achieve her desired election outcome. In fact, abstention is socially
1Throughout this paper I use feminine pronouns to describe voters, and masculine pronouns to describe
candidates.
2desirable: the best social outcomes are achieved when informed citizens vote and uninformed
citizens abstain.
While attractively simple, the information structure in the FP model is unrealistic: voter
heterogeneity is limited to two types, informed voters have perfect information, and unin-
formed voters are perfectly ignorant. The importance of the latter two restrictions can
be seen by comparing the FP model to a related framework, analyzed two centuries ear-
lier by Condorcet (1785). In that model, citizens each observe independent private signals






. Even if citizens are only barely informed (e.g. q = 0:51), the well-
known Condorcet jury theorem states that, as the number of voters grows large, the superior
candidate receives a majority of votes with probability approaching one (by the law of large
numbers). Thus everyone should vote, and the majority opinion of a su¢ ciently large
number of voters will be better-informed than that of any imperfectly-informed individual.
This ability to so e⁄ectively aggregate private information has long been regarded as one
of the most compelling justi￿cations for the extensive use of majority voting in collective
decision-making.
Like FP and Condorcet, I analyze voting behavior in a two-candidate election in which
voting is costless, and citizens have common values but imperfect information. As in the
Condorcet model, every agent receives a private indication of the superior candidate. Here,





of a citizen￿ s signal is individual-speci￿c, drawn randomly
from some common (and commonly-known) distribution F. In this framework, the Con-
dorcet model corresponds to a degenerate F, and the FP model a discrete F, with positive
mass only on the "informed" and "uninformed" extreme types Qi = 1 and Qi = 1
2. Of
particular interest are continuous F, for which these extreme types are realized with zero
probability.2
In this framework, the best response to any strategy is characterized by cutpoints on
posterior beliefs. Accordingly, equilibrium can be characterized by an information quality
threshold T ￿, above which agents vote sincerely and below which they abstain. The location
of T ￿ highlights the inherent con￿ ict between the quantity and quality of information: if T ￿
is high, voters are few but well-informed, as in the FP model; if T ￿ is low, voters are many
but on average less well-informed, as in the Condorcet model. With informative voting,
the superior candidate is more likely to be ahead by a single vote than behind by a single
vote, so a vote for the correct candidate is strictly less likely to be pivotal than a mistake.
2The importance of a generalized information structure is demonstrated by Duggan and Martinelli (2001)
and Meirowitz (2002), who overturn a surprising result in FP (1998) that unanimity rule gives jurors poor
incentives for truth-telling.
3Thus, voters su⁄er from the swing voter￿ s curse, and in equilibrium some agents abstain (i.e.
T ￿ > 1
2) even when they view one candidate as better than the other.
As a population grows, T ￿ rises, because the addition of voters strengthens the swing
voter￿ s curse. If F is continuous, then even an agent who might reasonably believe herself to
be the best informed member of a small electorate expects to eventually have an arbitrarily
large number of better-informed peers, as the population grows. In light of this, intuition
suggests that even an extremely well-informed citizen will at some point decide to abstain,
deferring to her better-informed peers; if so, the fraction of citizens who votes must fall to 0%
(i.e. T ￿ ! 1) as a population grows large. This intuition, however, turns out to be incorrect:
a one-vote loss indeed grows less likely, even relative to a one-vote win, but decreasingly so,
and T ￿ asymptotes at some level strictly below one. The precise limit of T ￿ is determined
by the underlying distribution of F, and (for most F) is unique; one bene￿t of this model is
a straightforward formula by which, for any F, turnout can be computed numerically.
As in both the Condorcet and FP models, this model predicts that the superior candidate
will be elected with probability approaching one as the electorate grows large. To maximize
this probability, however, the Condorcet model suggests that everyone should vote, while
the FP model suggests that uninformed citizens should abstain. In this model, a voluntary
election is ine¢ cient because, by allowing abstention, it fails to utilize nonvoters￿independent
private information. Surprisingly, however, mandatory actually only pools less information,
not more, because it loses information conveyed by the decision to vote. A ￿rst-best election
mechanism would weight votes by voters￿underlying con￿dence levels.
In addition to behavior and welfare predictions, this generalized information structure
provides useful comparative static results that are unavailable in simpler models. If every-
one￿ s information improves, for example, improves welfare but has two opposing e⁄ects on
turnout: it lowers abstention by lifting nonvoters above the participation threshold, but
also raises abstention by intensifying the swing voter￿ s curse; the net e⁄ect depends on
which where within the information distribution improvements are concentrated. A mean-
preserving decrease in the variance of information lowers abstention in most cases, by shrink-
ing the di⁄erence between informed and uninformed voters and thereby weakening the swing
voter￿ s curse. An increase in the cost of voting lowers turnout from its social optimum.
Like the original FP model, this model explains the empirical correlations enumerated
above between education and turnout, as well as the phenomenon of roll-o⁄, and absten-
tion in other costless voting environments. It further explains what Aldrich (1993) calls
"the most important substantive problem in the turnout literature," which is a paradox ob-
served by Brody (1978), that turnout has persistently fallen over recent decades even while
education levels have risen, so that education and turnout are positively associated in any
4cross-sectional study but negatively correlated over time. In the context of this model, one
explanation for this paradox is that an individual￿ s tendency to vote is increasing in her
own education level but decreasing in the education levels of others. A second possibility is
that, as the number and scope of laws and policies has proliferated over time, the decisions
required of politicians (and therefore voters) have grown more complicated, in e⁄ect shifting
the entire distribution of information quality downward, thereby swamping the in￿ uence
within the distribution caused by educational increases. Although information quality can-
not be readily observed, voting is sincere and turnout predictions for simple F are similar
to actual participation levels in the U.S. The opposite impact of one￿ s own and others￿
information quality implies that the importance of education, age, and other proxies of in-
formation quality should be relative rather than absolute, a subtle prediction that I con￿rm
empirically, using American National Election Studies (ANES) data on voter participation
in political party state primary elections.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. I present my model formally in
section 2.1, and in sections 2.2 through 2.6 I analyze equilibrium behavior in small and large
electorates, welfare, and comparative statics associated both with information and with
voting costs. I then present empirical evidence and applications in section 3, and conclude
in section 4. In most cases, proofs of analytical results are relogated to the Appendix A.
2 Analysis
2.1 The Model
In an election between two candidates or alternatives, A and B, there is an unknown
number N of potential voters, where N has Poisson distribution with mean ￿. For a par-






(with realization qi), drawn independently from a common and commonly-
known distribution F, which has a di⁄erentiable density f that is strictly positive between 1
2
and 1. Before the election, Nature designates one candidate Z 2 fA;Bg as superior to the
other. Citizens do not observe nature￿ s choice directly, but know that the candidates will be
chosen with equal probability. In addition, each agent receives a private signal Si 2 fa;bg
(with realization si) that corresponds to Z with probability Qi. That is,
Pr(Si = ajZ = A) = Pr(Si = bjZ = B) = Qi
Pr(Si = bjZ = A) = Pr(Si = ajZ = B) = 1 ￿ Qi
To a perfectly informed agent (i.e. Qi = 1), Si reveals Z perfectly, and to a perfectly
uninformed (i.e. Qi = 1
2) agent, the signal provides no information whatsoever; for most
5agents, of course, Si is somewhat informative but not perfectly so. Agents￿signals are
mutually independent (conditional on Z), and signal values are independent of information
levels.








speci￿es the distribution of the outcome Xi 2 fA;B;0g of her vote, where
a vote for candidate 0 represents abstention. Agents act simultaneously, and the election
winner X 2 fA;Bg is determined by simple majority rule, ￿ ipping a coin in the event of a tie.
Citizens each receive utility 1 if the superior candidate wins the election and 0 otherwise,
so that expected utility￿ and therefore social welfare￿ are given merely by the probability
Pr(X = Z).
I restrict attention to symmetric strategies and seek a symmetric Bayesian equilibrium.3





￿ fa;bg; an individual citizen of type (qi;si) reinterprets ￿ as a list of her opponents￿








EU (￿i;￿;qi;si) = Pr(X = Zj￿;￿i;qi;si) (1)
The strategy ￿￿
i that maximizes (1) is a best response to ￿, and ￿￿ is a symmetric
Bayesian equilibrium if ￿￿ (q;s) is a best response to ￿￿ for every (q;s).
Before proceeding to characterize best responses, it is worth noting that the assumption
here that voters share a common objective is less restrictive than it might seem. In the
real world, of course, political opinions vary dramatically, both between and within political
parties; here, too, posterior beliefs (given below by ￿i) regarding the probability of A being
superior to B vary continuously between 0 and 1. When individuals in the real world argue
over which of two policies to adopt, their disagreement frequently stems from their di⁄ering
predictions of what e⁄ects the competing policies will have; if the e⁄ects of two policies could
somehow be indisputably predicted, the superiority of one of the two alternatives may well
become obvious, so that voters no longer disagree.
2.2 Best Responses
In state A, an agent with information quality q receives an a signal with probability q and
a b signal with probability 1 ￿ q; in state B, the probabilities are reversed. Given a pro￿le
￿, therefore, the probability pxz with which a randomly chosen agent votes for candidate
3This restriction is merely for simplicity of exposition: even allowing asymmetric strategies, Theorem 1
guarantees that the best response to any pro￿le is symmetric. Any Bayesian equilibrium, therefore, must
be symmetric as well.





x (q;a) + (1 ￿ q)￿





x (q;b) + (1 ￿ q)￿
x (q;a)]dF (q) (3)
The expected number of votes for candidate x in state z is then given simply by ￿pxz.
By the decomposition property of Poisson random variables (see Myerson, 1998), the
numbers of A, B, and 0 votes in state z are independent Poisson random variables. For
any integer w, the probability ￿wz that the superior candidate wins the election by w votes
is simply the in￿nite sum of probabilities that k + w agents vote for the superior candidate
and only k vote for his opponent. Since an agent￿ s vote is pivotal when it creates or breaks
a tie, of particular interest are the probability ￿0z of a tie, and the probabilities ￿1z and ￿￿1z
with which the superior candidate wins and loses, respectively, by a single vote. In state A,





















































It is easy to see that ￿1A =
pAA
pBA￿￿1A, and also that with positive probability no agents vote,
resulting in a tie (i.e.  0A > 0, which implies ￿0A > 0).
By the environmental equivalence property of Poisson games (see Myerson, 1998) an
individual perceives from within the game that the number of her opponents, like the total
number of players from an outside perspective, has Poisson distribution with mean ￿, and
therefore that the numbers of her fellow citizens who vote for A, B, and 0, respectively, in
state z are independent Poisson random variables with means ￿pAz, ￿pBz, and ￿p0z. She
also reinterprets ￿wz as the probability that Z will win the election by w votes, should she
abstain.
7Using her private information, an agent can formulate posterior beliefs ￿i about the
distribution of Z:
￿i ￿ Pr(Z = AjQi;Si) =
(
Qi if Si = a





















































































2 in equation (9) re￿ ects the probability, in the event of a tied election, that
a tie-breaking coin toss will favor the superior candidate Z. From (9) it can be seen that
a vote for the superior candidate is only pivotal (i.e. in￿ uences the election outcome) when
either the candidates tie but Z loses the coin toss, or Z loses the election by a single vote,

















Using (10) and (11), de￿ne the ratios ￿A, ￿B, and ^ ￿ as follows.
￿A =
~ PB
PA + ~ PB
;￿B =
~ PA
~ PA + PB
(12)
^ ￿ =
PB + ~ PB
~ PA + PB + PA + ~ PB
(13)
As Theorem 1 now shows, these thresholds characterize the best response ￿￿
i to any strategy
pro￿le. Mathematically, ^ ￿ must lie between ￿A and 1￿￿B: when ￿A ￿ ^ ￿ ￿ 1￿￿B, a best
response is to vote A if ￿i 2 (^ ￿;1] and vote B if ￿i 2 [0; ^ ￿); when 1 ￿ ￿B ￿ ^ ￿ ￿ ￿A, it is
to vote A if ￿i 2 (￿A;1], vote B if ￿i 2 [0;1 ￿ ￿B), and abstain if ￿i 2 (1 ￿ ￿B;￿A). Best
responses are in pure strategies except precisely at these cutpoints, which occur with zero
probability.
8Theorem 1 De￿ne ￿A, ^ ￿, and ￿B as in (12) and (13) for a symmetric pro￿le ￿, and let
￿￿
i denote the best response to ￿ for a citizen with posterior beliefs given by ￿i, as de￿ned in
(8). Then the following must be true.
(i) If ￿A ￿ ^ ￿ ￿ 1 ￿ ￿B then ￿￿
i =
(
(1;0;0) if ￿i > ^ ￿
(0;1;0) if ￿i < ^ ￿
)





(1;0;0) if ￿i > ￿A
(0;0;1) if 1 ￿ ￿B < ￿i < ￿A




Proof. From (9) it is straightforward to verify the following.
EU ((1;0;0)) ￿ EU ((0;0;1)) = ￿iPA ￿ (1 ￿ ￿i) ~ PB (14)
EU ((0;1;0)) ￿ EU ((0;0;1)) = ￿￿i ~ PA + (1 ￿ ￿i)PB (15)
EU ((1;0;0)) ￿ EU ((0;1;0)) = ￿i
￿
PA + ~ PA
￿
￿ (1 ￿ ￿i)
￿
~ PB + PB
￿
(16)
(14) is positive if and only if ￿iPA > (1 ￿ ￿i) ~ PB or, equivalently, ￿i >
~ PB
PA+ ~ PB = ￿A.
Similarly, (15) and (16) are positive if and only if ￿i < 1 ￿ ￿B and ￿i > ^ ￿, respectively.
Part (i) then follows since ￿i > ^ ￿ ￿ ￿A implies that both (14) and (16) are positive and
￿i < ^ ￿ ￿ 1 ￿ ￿B implies that (15) is positive and (16) is negative. Part (ii) follows since
￿i > ￿A ￿ ^ ￿ implies that both (15) and (16) are positive, 1 ￿ ￿B < ￿i < ￿A implies that
both (15) and (16) are negative, and ￿i < 1 ￿ ￿B ￿ ^ ￿ implies that (15) is positive and (16)
is negative.
One interpretation of the best response thresholds ￿A, ^ ￿, and ￿B is as conditional prob-
abilities. For example, ￿A denotes the probability that an A vote is pivotal in the wrong
direction (i.e. in state B) conditional on its being pivotal at all. If this probability is high,
it discourages voters from casting A votes; thus the corresponding A threshold is high, and
only those voters with the strongest posterior beliefs vote for candidate A.
2.3 Equilibrium
An equilibrium strategy pro￿le must be its own best response. As Theorem 2 now states,
this is only possible when ￿A > 1
2 and ￿B > 1
2. By condition (ii) of Theorem 1, this implies
that citizens vote informatively (i.e. vote A or B in response to a or b signals, respectively)
if su¢ ciently well-informed (i.e. if Qi ￿ ￿A or Qi ￿ ￿B, respectively) and otherwise abstain.
In this model, informative and sincere voting (i.e. voting as if directly choosing the election
outcome) are equivalent.
Theorem 2 Let ￿￿ be a symmetric Bayesian equilibrium and let ￿A and ￿B be the posterior
thresholds de￿ned in (12). Then ￿A ￿ 1
2 and ￿B ￿ 1
2.
9Proof. See Appendix A.
Given this characterization of equilibrium voting, it is useful to de￿ne an informative-











(1;0;0) if s = a and q ￿ TA
(0;1;0) if s = b and q ￿ TB
(0;0;1) otherwise
(17)
Taken together, Theorems 1 and 2 imply that an equilibrium pro￿le ￿￿ must be IPC, with
participation thresholds TA = ￿A and TB = ￿B. Theorem 4 will further show ￿￿ to be
signal-symmetric (SIPC), so that the thresholds coincide (i.e. TA = TB = T).
Under an SIPC strategy, citizens vote informatively if Qi ￿ T, and otherwise abstain.
Therefore, the vote probabilities from (2) and (3) no longer depend on the state of the world,








(1 ￿ q)dF (q) = pAB = pBA (19)
Similarly, win and pivot probabilities can be written simply as ￿w, P, and ~ P. Accordingly,
best response cutpoints coincide (i.e. ￿A = ￿B) and the best response to ￿T;T is itself SIPC,
with a participation threshold TBR that depends on the participation threshold T, as follows:
TBR (T) ￿
~ P
P + ~ P
(20)
In general, TBR (T) may be either greater or less than T; for a ￿xed point T ￿ = TBR (T ￿),
the corresponding SIPC pro￿le ￿T￿;T￿ must be its own best response, and therefore an SIPC
Bayesian equilibrium. Theorem 3 now states that such a ￿xed point, and therefore an SIPC
Bayesian equilibrium, must always exist. In such an equilibrium 1
2 < T ￿ < 1, meaning that
both voting and abstention must both be positive.
Theorem 3 There exists a threshold T ￿ strictly between 1
2 and 1 such that the SIPC pro￿le
















is compact, so Brouwer￿ s ￿xed point
theorem gives existence. Following ￿ 1
2; 1
2, all citizens vote, in which case p+ > p￿, ￿1 > ￿￿1,
and therefore ~ P > P. In other words, a mistake is strictly more likely to be pivotal than
a correct vote. This implies that an agent of type Qi = 1







10Similarly, by ￿1;1 no one votes; in that case, any vote would be pivotal (i.e. P = ~ P = 1
2), so
anyone should vote in response (i.e. TBR (1) = 1
2).
Having shown that an SIPC equilibrium exists, Theorem 4 next shows that, in fact, all
equilibria are SIPC. In principle there could be multiple SIPC equilibria, though the proof
of Theorem 4 suggests that this is impossible for su¢ ciently smooth F. Conditions for
uniqueness in large electorates are made more precise by Theorem 7 in section 2.4.
Theorem 4 If ￿￿ is a Bayesian equilibrium then it is SIPC.
Proof. See Appendix A.
2.4 Large Elections
In this section I analyze asymptotic equilibrium behavior as a population grows large. In
doing so, I denote the implicit dependence of the best response and equilibrium participation
thresholds T
￿
BR and T ￿
￿ on the population size parameter ￿ by a superscript and subscript,
respectively. As the number of voters grows large, the superior candidate wins the election
with increasing probability. This strengthens the swing voter￿ s curse so that the marginal
voter, who had previously been indi⁄erent between voting and abstaining, now strictly prefers
to abstain, leaving the election decision in the hands of those with superior information.
Accordingly, the best response threshold rises and the participation rate declines. More
formally, Theorem 5 states that T
￿
BR (T) is increasing in ￿ for any cutpoint T < 1.4 The
highest and lowest ￿xed points of T
￿
BR (or the only ￿xed point, if T ￿
￿ is unique) must therefore
rise with ￿.





, the best response threshold T
￿
BR (T) is increasing in ￿.
Proof. See Appendix A.
In the FP model, uninformed voters abstain with increasing probability until, in the
limit, they all abstain. Turnout is nevertheless positive, however, because informed citizens
always vote. Here, voters are in a way both informed and uninformed. When ￿ is small, a
citizen might reasonably expect to be the best informed voter in the electorate. As ￿ ! 1,
however, the expected number of better-informed citizens grows arbitrarily large. This may
seem to suggest that even extremely well-informed citizens will eventually defer to those
with better information (or, equivalently, that T ￿
￿ ! 1), so that turnout approaches 0%. In
evaluating this possibility, Lemma 1 derives the function L(T) to which T
￿
BR converges:







1 ￿ M (T)
(21)
where the mean quality function M (T) ￿ E (QjQ ￿ T) = 1
1￿F(T)
R 1
T qdF (q) =
p+
p++p￿ gives
the average information quality of citizens who vote. Equivalently, M is the expected vote
share of the superior candidate.







BR = L(T), as de￿ned as in (21).
Proof. See Appendix A.
Since T
￿
BR (T) ! L(T), any limit point of a sequence of ￿xed points of T
￿
BR must be a
point of L. Theorem 6 now shows that such a ￿xed point must be strictly less than one.
In other words, turnout remains bounded strictly above 0%, even as an electorate grows
arbitrarily large. The fallacy in the above intuition is that, while a citizen indeed expects
both the quantity and the quality of opponents￿votes to be high, she bases her behavior not
on her expectations, but rather on her conditional expectations: when her vote is pivotal,
her opponents￿votes must be of far lower quantity and quality than she originally expected;
the di⁄erence in this case between a one-vote win and a one-vote continues to grow, but
decreasingly so. By voting rather than abstaining in a ￿nite election, the marginal voter
drags down the average quality of votes cast. Her impact on the average quality is reduced,
however, as the number of voters grows; in the limit, she contributes to the quantity of votes







be a sequence of equilibrium participation thresholds for a se-
quence ￿k of population parameters such that ￿k ! 1 as k ! 1, and let T ￿







. Then T ￿
1 < 1.
Proof. See Appendix A.
In general, it is possible for L to have multiple ￿xed points between 1
2 and 1. If the
density f is log-concave (i.e. log(f) is concave or, equivalently,
f0
f is decreasing), however, as
it is for many of the most common distributions,5 then Theorem 7 rules out this possibility.6
Uniqueness in the limit, of course, implies a unique participation cutpoint T ￿
￿ for any ￿
su¢ ciently large.
5Bagnoli and Bergstrom (2005) show the following distributions to have log-concave densities: uniform,
normal, logistic, extreme value, chi-squared, chi, exponential, Laplace, Weibull (for some parameter values),
power function, gamma, and beta. Also, any truncation, linear transformation, or mirror-image of a log-
concave density is log-concave.
6Log-concavity is a stronger condition than necessary. T￿
1 may easily be unique, for example, if F is
bimodal, though f is not log-concave in that case. As the proof of Theorem 7 makes clear, the important










Figure 1: Participation thresholds and turnout rates for simple information distributions
Theorem 7 If f is log-concave then L has a unique ￿xed point T ￿
1 strictly between 1
2 and 1.
Proof. See Appendix A.
With a unique equilibrium threshold T ￿
1, the participation rate 1 ￿ F (T ￿
1) is likewise
unique. Since these values depend exclusively on the underlying information distribution,
both may be computed numerically for any closed-form F, using the formula from (21).
To illustrate, Figure 1 displays the equilibrium participation thresholds and turnout rates
associated with some simple distributions. If information quality is distributed uniformly
between 1
2 and 1, for example, the limiting cutpoint is T ￿
1 = 0:71, and the best-informed
59% of citizens vote.
2.5 Welfare and Election Design
Since voters share common values, social welfare is equivalent to individual utility, and
can therefore be measured by the probability Pr(X = Z) of electing the superior candidate.
As ￿ ! 1, the law of large numbers implies that candidate Z￿ s actual vote share approaches
the expected vote share, M (T ￿
1). As in the original Condorcet jury theorem, therefore,
Pr(X = Z) ! 1. On the other hand, one message of the original Condorcet model is that
election decisions are best made by utilizing the independent information of as many voters as
possible, even if that information is of low quality. While it is di¢ cult to attribute precise
meaning to informal arguments, this logic seems to underlie the commonly held concern
that low and declining voter turnout is a serious threat to democracy. To prevent voter
abstention, a number of democracies (e.g. Australia and several Latin American countries)
have made voting compulsory; Lijphart (1997), among others, recommends that the United
States do the same.
With common values, however, the socially optimal level of turnout must be achieved
in equilibrium; since T ￿ > 1
2 in the unique equilibrium, it must be that mandatory voting
actually pools less, not more information, than voluntary voting. One intuition for this
rather surprising result is that a majority election must weights votes equally. A compulsory
election collects a larger number of signals, but collects no information regarding the quality
13of those signals; in a voluntary election, voters￿signals (i.e. signals for which Qi ￿ T ￿) are
given more weight than nonvoters￿signals (i.e. signals for which Qi < T ￿).7 The optimal
election mechanism would directly ask voters to report both Qi and Si,8 and would weight
individual votes by their underlying quality in a maximum likelihood approach, so that
candidate A wins if and only if the probability of observing fSig
N
i=1 is greater when A is













According to Lijphart (1997), John Stuart Mill proposed in 1861 that educated voters be
allowed to vote two or more times in an election, and such a system was actually used in
Belgium from 1893 to 1919; clearly, the intent of such a policy is similar to the one I have
described. A similar method would be to allow voters to rate candidates on a point scale
(say 1 to 10), as is common in judging arts and athletic competitions. By awarding two
candidates the same number of points, a judge e⁄ectively demonstrates that Qi = 1
2, while
awarding 10 to one and 1 to the other demonstrates Qi close to one.
2.6 Comparative Statics
Information Quality
The distribution F of information quality that uniquely determines equilibrium voting
behavior is itself determined by factors that may vary both regionally and over time, such as
voters￿education or experience levels, and access to information technology. In this section,
therefore, I analyze how turnout responds to changes in F, adding a superscript to denote
the reliance on F of the mean quality function MF, the limiting best response function LF,
and the limiting participation threshold T F
1. Participation is given by the survival function
7Analyzing a model similar to this, Krishna and Morgan (2008) likewise conclude that mandatory voting
pools less information than voluntary voting, but for an entirely di⁄erent reason. In their model, signal
quality depends on the state (i.e. a signals are more reliable than b signals). To compensate for this,
citizens strategically abstain, if allowed; otherwise, they vote uninformatively, and information is aggregated
less e⁄ectively.
8Since values are common, voters have an incentive to tell the truth: if Si = A and Qi = q then claiming
Qi > q just increases the probability of wrongly electing A, and claiming Qi < q just increases the chance of
wrongly electing B.
9See Shapley and Grofman (1984). This rule is equivalent to a standard voluntary election if some voters
are perfectly uninformed (i.e. Qi = 1
2) and others have identical information quality (i.e. Qi = q > 1
2), and
to a mandatory election if everyone belongs to the latter group. Note that this decision rule is distinct from
the Maximum Likelihood rule developed by Kemeny (1959) and discussed by Young (1995), which seeks
instead to identify an "average" preference ranking among voters, in an election with multiple candidates.
14￿ F ￿ 1￿F, evaluated at T F
1. In what follows, I compare T F












associated with an alternative distribution G. In preparation for
this, Lemma 2 presents a useful condition that is equivalent to T G
1 > T F
1.
Lemma 2 Let F and G be continuous, log-concave distributions with strictly positive densi-
ties, and let T F
1 and T G
1 and MF and MG denote the unique limiting participation thresholds
and mean quality functions for F and G, respectively. Then T G
1 > T F
1 if and only if
















To begin, consider a general improvement in information quality. G is said to ￿rst-order
stochastically dominate F (written G ￿1 F) if, for any quality level q, the fraction of citizens
with information quality better than q is higher under G than under F (i.e. ￿ G(q) ￿ ￿ F (q)
for all q). In general, moving from F to G has two opposite e⁄ects: turnout increases
as nonvoters are lifted above the participation threshold, but decreases as improved voter
information strengthens the swing voter￿ s curse. Which of these two e⁄ects dominates
depends primarily on whose information quality improves most, as Theorem 8 emphasizes:
(1) below T ￿
1, small information improvements have no e⁄ect because citizens do not vote;
(2) above T ￿
1, information improvements lower turnout by strengthening the swing voter￿ s
curse; (3) moderate improvements in nonvoters￿information increase turnout, both directly
(by pushing nonvoters above T ￿
1) and indirectly (by lowering the average vote quality, thereby
weakening the swing voter￿ s curse and lowering T ￿
1).10 These e⁄ects are illustrated with
numerical examples in Figure 2, starting from a uniform distribution. Regardless of its
e⁄ect on turnout, the direct welfare e⁄ect of improving information quality is to improve
election accuracy, and any strategic response to improved information can only increase
welfare further.
Theorem 8 Let F and G be continuous, log-concave distributions with strictly positive den-
sities, and suppose G ￿1 F. Then the following must be true:
1. If G(q) = F (q) for all q ￿ T F
1 then T G
1 = T F











2. If G(q) = F (q) for all q ￿ T F
1 then T G
1 ￿ T F


















































Figure 2: When information improves for di⁄erent segments of the electorate, turnout may







Figure 3: A mean-preserving decrease/increase in the variance of information quality
raises/lowers turnout.
Proof. See Appendix A.
Of course, it may be that neither of two distributions ￿rst-order stochastically dominates
the other. A related but weaker condition is that
R T
1=2 ￿ G(q)dq ￿
R T
1=2 ￿ F (q)dq for every T, or
that G second-order stochastically dominates F (written G ￿2 F). For distributions with a
common mean, G ￿2 F implies that G has a smaller variance than F. In this case, provided
that T F
1 lies below the common mean (as numerical examples suggest is typical), Theorem
9 states that turnout is higher under G than under F. Intuitively, this is because the swing
voter￿ s curse is weak when the quality di⁄erence between informed and uninformed votes
is small; in the extreme case, voters all have identical information quality and turnout is
100%, as in the Condorcet model. The welfare di⁄erence between F and G is ambiguous;
though the number of votes is higher in G, the average quality of votes is higher in F. The
association between variance and turnout is illustrated for a uniform distribution in Figure
3.
Theorem 9 Let F and G be continuous, log-concave distributions with strictly positive den-
sities and a common mean m, such that G ￿2 F and T F
1 ￿ m. Then T G













Proof. See Appendix A.
10Symmetrically, information reductions below T have no e⁄ect, small reductions above T increase turnout,
and moderate reductions above T reduce turnout both directly and indirectly.
16Voting Costs and Bene￿ts
While the swing voter￿ s curse is particularly notable for its explanation of abstention
in costless environments, the cost of voting in the majority of real-world election settings
is clearly positive.11 If voters pay a cost C > 0 and obtain a bene￿t B for improving
the election outcome, the expected bene￿t of voting will exceed the cost if and only if the
following (equivalent) inequalities hold:
QiPB + (1 ￿ Qi) ~ P (￿B) > C (23) h
Qi
￿






~ P + C
B
P + ~ P
(24)
With the addition of this C
B term, this new participation threshold is higher￿ and turnout is
lower￿ than before. Since the former level of turnout maximizes social welfare (as discussed
in section 2.5), the new level is ine¢ ciently low. The extent of this distortion depends on
the size of the bene￿t term; fortunately, in an "important" election (i.e. when B is large)
the distortion term is small.12
The prediction that voting costs discourage turnout raises the question of why citizens
nevertheless participate in large elections? As Downs (1957) observes, pivot probabilities
shrink asymptotically to zero as the number of voters grows large, so the inequality in (23)
eventually fails as ￿ ! 1, and voting appears irrational. In response to this "turnout
paradox", Riker and Ordeshook (1968) hypothesize that voters are motivated by a sense of
civic duty (or respond to social pressure), incurring a private cost for the bene￿t of society.13
This explanation has limited justi￿cation when preferences are not common (since, as Borgers
2004 shows, turnout is too high in that case, rather than too low14), but in this common-
values setting a sense of duty is completely natural.
To formalize the notion of civic duty, Riker and Ordeshook (1968) add a bene￿t D to
the left hand side of (23), independent of the election outcome. Accordingly, even as pivot
11Knack (1994), for instance, con￿rms the conventional wisdom that inclement weather slightly lowers
turnout.
12Interestingly, when voting is costless the importance of an election does not in￿ uence voters￿participation
decisions: a high B renders a correct vote more valuable, but also makes an incorrect vote more painful.
Thus, important races on a ballot may attract voters to polls, but will not in￿ uence voters￿roll-o⁄ decisions
once they arrive (and voting costs are sunk).
13Dowding (2005) and Geys (2006) review numerous attempts to rationalize voting behavior, but none
has endured longer than Riker and Ordeshook￿ s (1968) duty hypothesis.
14If turnout is too high, civic duty should lead citizens to abstain, rather than to vote, and society should
recognize nonvoters, rather than voters, as being good citizens.
17probabilities tend to zero, (23) remains satis￿ed as long as D > C. With this addition, (24)
becomes the following:
Qi >
~ P + C￿D
B
P + ~ P
(25)
From (25) it is clear that D reduces the turnout distortion generated by voting costs, thereby
mitigating the externality. If D > C, however, then the externality actually reverses: since
welfare was uniquely maximized for the original threshold
~ P
P+ ~ P, any threshold higher or
lower than that reduces welfare. Thus, while the notion of civic duty is compelling in this
common values setting, the D term formulation used by Riker and Ordeshook (1968) is
problematic: D > C actually reduces welfare, while D < C is too small to motivate turnout
when pivot probabilities tend to zero. One alternative formulation for civic duty that can
only be welfare-improving is an in￿ ated B term, though only an in￿nite B would completely
eliminate the turnout distortion in (24).15
3 Evidence and Applications
3.1 Sincere Voting, Moderate Turnout, and Roll-o⁄
Matsusaka (1993) questions whether voters are su¢ ciently sophisticated to be able to
calculate and respond to miniscule pivot probabilities. Recreating the incentives of the
original FP model in an experimental setting, Battaglini, Morton, and Palfrey (2006) con￿rm
that players can and indeed do respond to the swing voter￿ s curse, but leave open the question
of whether citizens vote strategically in the real world. One prediction of many game-
theoretic voting models, beginning with Austen-Smith and Banks (1996), is that equilibrium
voting is insincere. Using panel data on voting behavior, however, Degan and Merlo (2007b)
fail to reject the hypothesis that voters merely vote sincerely. Sincere voting, however, is
perfectly consistent with this model: strategic considerations guide voters￿participation
decisions, but citizens vote sincerely if they vote at all (Theorems 1 and 2).
It is di¢ cult to test this model￿ s validity formally, since information quality cannot be
directly observed. Informally, however, Figure 1 illustrates how predicted turnout rates can
be computed for simple distributions, using equation (21). Roughly speaking, turnout rates
predicted for these distributions are similar to actual participation rates in U.S. state and
national elections. No matter the distribution, the result from Theorem 6 that 1
2 < T ￿
1 < 1
guarantees that both turnout and abstention will be positive, even in a large electorate.
15Edlin, Gelman, and Kaplan (2005) hypothesize that voters are motivated by altruism. If voters receive
a bene￿t ￿ for each fellow-citizen that a policy bene￿ts in addition to the private bene￿t B, then the total
bene￿t B + ￿￿ indeed approaches in￿nity as the population grows large.
18Avoiding some of the criticisms of strategic models, Matsusaka (1995) explains the con-
nection between education and voting in a model that is similar to this but decision-theoretic:
the expected bene￿t of voting is increasing in Qi, so uninformed citizens are more easily dis-
suaded by voting costs. As FP rightly point out, however, this fails to explain the ubiquitous
phenomenon of roll-o⁄ voting, since, for a citizen inside the voting booth, voting costs are
sunk. Other examples of costless voting environments include committee voting, which
requires only the raise of a hand, and mail-in ballots (available in most states and used
exclusively in the state of Oregon), which allow citizens to vote conveniently from home.
These examples of abstention even when voting is costless can be accommodated in this
model, since for Qi su¢ ciently low, the expected bene￿t of voting is actually negative.
3.2 Turnout and Education
Another evidence of the validity of this model is the strong empirical connection be-
tween education and voting, as mentioned in the Introduction. To reiterate, Wol￿nger and
Rosenstone (1980) ￿nd education to be the best available predictor of voting. The con-
nection between education and information quality is intuitive; as mentioned earlier, several
authors (e.g. Bartels, 1996; Degan and Merlo, 2007a; and Larcinese, 2006) also ￿nd direct
empirical connections between information quality and voting, and Lassen (2005) ￿nds that,
controlling appropriately for information, education does not otherwise in￿ uence turnout.
Even to the extent that alternative theories can and do explain the positive association
between education and voting, they inevitably fail to explain the paradoxical observation by
Brody (1978) that voter participation has persistently fallen over recent decades even while
education levels have risen, so that education and turnout are positively correlated in any
given election, but negatively correlated over time. Surveying the literature, Aldrich (1993)
discusses problems with existing explanations of this phenomenon, ultimately ￿nding it to
be "the most important substantive problem in the turnout literature."
In contrast with other models, this model provides at least two plausible explanations for
the Brody (1978) paradox. First, note that while an increase in a citizen￿ s own information
quality makes her more likely to vote, an increase in her peers￿information makes a citizen
less likely to vote, by strengthening the swing voter￿ s curse.16 To illustrate this, compare
the ￿rst two panels of Figure 1, and note that a citizen with information quality Qi = 0:7
will vote in the second electorate, but will abstain from voting in the ￿rst, because her peers￿
information quality is higher. Thus, as education levels increase generally, it is entirely
possible that citizens who formerly voted should now abstain.
16FP (1999) demonstrate this possibility for certain parameter values, but the larger class of information
distributions here facilitates a much more detailed analysis.
19A second possibility is that, even though education levels have risen for certain demo-
graphics, information quality in general has declined, because of other factors. For example,
as the number and scope of laws and policies have proliferated over time, the decisions
required of politicians (and therefore voters) may have grown more complicated, in e⁄ect
shifting the entire distribution of information quality downward. A citizen who, decades
ago, might have felt con￿dent in her opinions on most political issues, may ￿nd now that
many issues extend beyond her training and expertise.
Admittedly, these two explanations are somewhat contradictory: the ￿rst asserts that im-
proved information lowers turnout by strengthening the swing voter￿ s curse, and the second
that reduced information quality lowers turnout by dragging voters below the participation
threshold; an alternative possibility is that improved information raises turnout by lift-
ing nonvoters above the participation threshold, or that reduced information quality raises
turnout by weakening the swing voter￿ s curse. It is conceivable that information quality has
improved for certain segments of society but decreased overall, but whether this will raise
or lower turnout depends on the distribution, as described by Theorem 8. Therefore, which
of the two explanations is at work￿ or which is dominant, if both are at work￿ are questions
better left for future research; the primary purpose of this discussion is to illustrate how eas-
ily this model accommodates an empirical phenomenon which has previously been di¢ cult
to explain.
3.3 Absolute vs. Relative Information
The result that an individual￿ s own information quality makes her more likely to vote
while others￿information quality makes her less likely to vote implies that the importance
of information quality is somewhat relative, not absolute. Put di⁄erently, a citizen is most
likely to vote when her own information quality is high, but when the information quality
of others in her electorate is low. This provides a subtle di⁄erence between strategic and
decision-theoretic motivations for abstention, which can be tested empirically, using estab-
lished information proxies such as education and age. In this section I present statistical
evidence from the American National Election Studies (ANES). During presidential elec-
tion years between 1972 and 1992, the ANES asked respondents whether or not they had
participated in their state￿ s political primary elections, the previous spring. Though pref-
erences within a party may be quite heterogeneous, the common values assumption is likely
a good approximation here, since the over-arching goal within a political party is to select
candidates who will be most likely to triumph in the upcoming general election.
Table 1 displays results from a probit model, where the dependent variable is equal to
one if an individual voted in her party￿ s state primary election, and zero otherwise. The
201a 1b 2a 2b 3a 3b
Education (level) 0.0252*** -0.0001 0.0283*** 0.0048 0.0340*** 0.0101
(5.87) (-0.01) (6.35) (0.36) (6.03) (0.71)
Education (%) - 0.0017** - 0.0015* - 0.0015*
- (2.45) - (1.89) - (1.80)
Age (level) 0.0057*** 0.0018 0.0016*** 0.0020 0.0073*** 0.002
(15.07) (1.47) (15.48) (1.27) (14.86) (1.29)
Age (%) - 0.0026*** - 0.0026*** - 0.0034***
- (3.45) - (2.76) - (3.58)
Income (level) 0.0384*** 0.0082 0.0396 0.0024 0.0431*** -0.0225
(6.16) (0.43) (6.13) (0.10) (5.23) (-0.89)
Income (%) - 0.0010 - 0.0012 - 0.0023**
- (1.49) - (1.50) - (2.52)
Information (level) 0.0707*** 0.0207 0.0750*** 0.0322 0.0681*** 0.0065
(10.16) (1.1) (10.36) (1.35) (7.43) (0.25)
Information (%) - 0.0019*** - 0.0015* - 0.0023**
- (2.87) - (1.85) - (2.45)
Year dummies yes yes - - yes yes
State-Party dummies yes yes - - yes yes
Year-State-Party dummies - - yes yes - -
# of Observations 6614 6614 6507 6507 4125 4125
Years 1972-92 1972-92 1972-92 1972-92 1980-92 1980-92
Pseudo R-squared 0.123 0.132 0.151 0.153 0.142 0.148
Notes: Table entries are marginal effects, with z-statistics in parenthesis.  All specifications include controls (not shown) for gender
and race.  Data source is American National Election Studies (1972, 1976, 1980, 1988, 1992).  Percentile variables are computed
within year-state-party groups.  *, **, ***, indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.
Probit:  1 = voted in primary election
Table 1-----Information and Voting in Primary Elections
independent variables are standard proxies of information quality: education (in seven cate-
gories), age (in years), income17 (in ￿ve categories), and a subjective measure of information
quality (in ￿ve categories) made by the interviewer at the time of an interview.18 For each
absolute information proxy, I also compare an individual with the others from the same
state, year, and party,19 to generate a percentile variable that indicates an individual￿ s rel-
ative position within the distribution of her peers. Her education percentile, for example,
indicates the fraction of her peers with education levels lower than or equal to than her
own. Non-strategic models of abstention, such as Matsusaka (1995), may predict a positive
relationship between absolute information and voting, but provide no reason to expect rela-
tive information measures to have any coe¢ cient other than zero. This model, in contrast,
predicts that relative information quality should have a positive relationship with voting,
while making no predictions regarding the importance of absolute information.20
17Income can approximate information quality if both are in￿ uenced by, say, analytical thinking skills.
18Zaller (1985) ￿nds interviewers￿impressions to be the most useful information variable for explaining
turnout in the ANES. Interviews were conducted both before and after the November general elections; I
use the pre-election information measure, but the post-election measure yields similar results.
19State-year-party groups with fewer than 15 observations are discarded. Other size cuto⁄s yield similar
results.
20As discussed in section 2.6, comparative statics results regarding the absolute level of information quality
are ambiguous.
21Speci￿cations I and II include controls for gender and race, as well as ￿xed year e⁄ects
and ￿xed e⁄ects for each of the sixty-two state-party pairs. Speci￿cation I includes only the
absolute information proxies, each of which exhibits a strong and positive relationship with
turnout. The cell entries in Table 1 are marginal e⁄ects and z-statistics; other things equal,
increasing one education, income, or information quality level, respectively, makes a citizen
2:5%, 3:8%, and 7:1% more likely to vote. To this, speci￿cation II adds the percentile proxies
of relative information quality. With this addition, the marginal e⁄ects of absolute variables
are each reduced by over two thirds. None remains signi￿cant at conventional levels, and
the point estimate of the marginal e⁄ect of education actually becomes slightly negative.
The relative information proxies, on the other hand, are all positive and strongly signi￿cant
(with the exception of income, which is statistically insigni￿cant, but more signi￿cant than
the absolute measure of income, with a z-statistic of 1:49 versus 0:43).
The magnitudes of the marginal e⁄ects of absolute and relative information proxies cannot
be compared directly, since the former is the marginal e⁄ect of increasing one category of
education, income, or information quality, or one year of age; while the latter is the marginal
e⁄ect of rising by one percentage point within a distribution. However, the two can be
compared by considering a transition from the bottom of the distribution to the top. For
example, other things equal, rising from the bottom to the top of the education distribution
makes a citizen 100 ￿ 0:17% = 17% more likely to vote. Rising from the bottom to the
top of the age, income, and information distributions makes her 26%, 10%, and 19% more
likely to vote, respectively. In contrast, moving from age 17 to age 99 makes a citizen only
82 ￿ 0:18% = 14:76% more likely to vote, and moving from income or information category
1 to category 5 makes her 4 ￿ 0:82% = 3:28% and 4 ￿ 2:07% = 8:28% more likely to vote,
respectively. The absolute level of education has no (or even negative) impact on turnout,
and the 17% increase in voting propensity because of moving from the bottom to the top of
the education distribution is even larger than the 6 ￿ 2:52% = 15:12% increase associated
with moving from education category 1 to category 7, in speci￿cation I.
The remaining columns of Table 1 are similar to columns I and II. Instead of ￿xed year
and separate state-party e⁄ects, speci￿cations III and IV include ￿xed e⁄ects for each of
the 189 state-year-party groups with at least 15 observations. Speci￿cations V and VI use
the original ￿xed e⁄ects, but only use the most recent data, beginning in 1980. In both
cases, the qualitative results of speci￿cations I and II are repeated: excluding the percentile
variables, regressions III and V exhibit large and signi￿cant marginal absolute e⁄ects. When
percentiles are included in IV and VI, these absolute variables lose signi￿cance and the
marginal relative e⁄ects are instead positive and signi￿cant. The consistent importance
of relative information quality, together with the consistent loss of signi￿cance of absolute
22information quality, suggest that voters indeed respond (either deliberately or instinctively)
to the information quality of those around them, by choosing not to vote.
4 Conclusion
In a common values election setting, the in￿ uential models of Condorcet (1785) and
Feddersen and Pesendorfer (1996) predict opposite reactions to imperfect information: in
the FP model, the swing voter￿ s curse leads poorly informed citizens to abstain from voting;
in the Condorcet model everyone votes, so that the election decision will be based on as
much (albeit low-quality) information as possible. By allowing an arbitrary distribution of
information quality, this model becomes a natural but insightful blend of its predecessors:
below the unique equilibrium participation threshold T ￿, citizens opt not to express their
own opinions, deferring instead to those with better information; above T ￿, citizens vote
even when the number of better-informed peers grows in￿nitely large.
While turnout decisions are made strategically, voting is sincere (and in pure strategies).
Though information quality cannot be readily observed, simple distributions yield turnout
predictions similar to actual participation levels in U.S. state and national elections, and vot-
ing and abstention both remain positive, even in large electorates. Strategic considerations
can explain abstention in costless voting environments, such as roll-o⁄, and comparative
statics can explain the empirical association between voting and education or information,
as well as the simultaneous rise and fall of education and turnout. Also, the empirical im-
portance of education, age, and other reasonable proxies of information quality in explaining
participation in party primary elections appears to be relative, rather than absolute.
One prediction of this model that fails empirically is that elections should tend to result
in landslide victories. The expected margin of victory (as a fraction of the total number of
voters) is MV = 2
￿
E (QjQ ￿ T ￿) ￿ 1
2
￿
,21 which is extremely high for many distributions:
for the uniform distribution illustrated in Figure 1, for example, Z gets over 85% of the
votes! Related to this is the unrealistic assumption that citizens cannot communicate their
information to each other prior to an election. As Coughlan (2000) points out in response
to FP (1998), if citizens were allowed to communicate freely, asymmetric information would
be eliminated and voting would be unanimous. Without completely abandoning the basic
framework of this model, two possible approaches for avoiding these unrealistic results are to
relax the assumptions of common values or common prior beliefs; I discuss these possibilities
in McMurray (2008).
21This expression is given by the di⁄erence between the expected numbers E (Qiji votes) and
E (1 ￿ Qiji votes) = 1 ￿ E (Qiji votes) of votes for and against Z.
23Like both the FP and Condorcet models, this model predicts that, as the population grows
large, the best candidate will be elected with probability approaching one. To maximize
social welfare, however, the FP model implies that poorly informed citizens should abstain,
while the Condorcet model implies they should vote. Here, because poorly informed citizens
are not perfectly uninformed, abstention is ine¢ cient. Compulsory voting laws, however,
only exacerbate the problem, losing information conveyed by the turnout decision itself; a
better approach would be to weight voters￿opinions with their accuracy levels. If voting is
costly, it generates a positive externality. A sense of civic duty could mitigate this externality,
but is an unsatisfactory resolution for the "paradox of turnout" in large elections, as a large
sense of duty actually reverses the voting externality.
While voter abstention has traditionally been viewed as a serious threat to democracy,
this model demonstrates that turnout can also be too high. Rather than targeting turnout
per se, therefore, government policy and social activism should focus on eliminating barriers
to voting (e.g. simplify registration requirements, provide rides to polls, institute internet
voting, etc.). Even if barriers were completely eliminated, 100% turnout is unlikely, but
the resulting equilibrium level of turnout would be socially optimal. Recent declines in
voter turnout may or may not be cause for alarm; as mentioned above, two somewhat
opposite possibilities are that falling turnout re￿ ects either a strategic response to educational
improvements, or a general rise in the complexity of government. Improving education
and voter information and simplifying, limiting, or otherwise reducing the complexity of
government will have ambiguous e⁄ects on turnout, but can only improve social welfare.
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27Appendices
A Proofs
Theorem 2 Let ￿￿ be a symmetric Bayesian equilibrium and let ￿A and ￿B be the posterior
thresholds de￿ned in (12). Then ￿A > 1
2 and ￿B > 1
2.
Proof. I ￿rst show that ￿A ￿ 1 ￿ ￿B by supposing to the contrary that ￿A < 1 ￿ ￿B.
According to condition (i) of Theorem 1, then, the best response ￿BR to ￿￿ consists of
voting for A whenever ￿i > ^ ￿ and voting B otherwise, never abstaining. I assume here that
^ ￿ ￿ 1
2; otherwise a symmetric argument applies. When ^ ￿ ￿ 1
2, all agents of quality q < ^ ￿
vote B; above ^ ￿, agents vote informatively (i.e. ￿A
BR (q;a) = ￿B
BR (q;b) = 1). Therefore, the
vote probabilities from (2) and (3) simplify to the following,
pAA =
R 1
^ ￿ qdF (q) pBA = F (^ ￿) +
R 1
^ ￿ (1 ￿ q)dF (q)
pAB =
R 1
^ ￿ (1 ￿ q)dF (q) pBB = F (^ ￿) +
R 1
^ ￿ qdF (q)
implying the following inequalities:
pBB > pBA > pAB (26)
pBB > pAA > pAB (27)
pAApBA > pABpBB (28)
Given (26) through (28), I now argue that PAPB < ~ PA ~ PB or, equivalently, that ￿A >
1 ￿ ￿B, which is the desired contradiction:




(￿0A + ￿￿1A)(￿0B + ￿￿1B) ￿
1
4

































































(pAB ￿ pBB) +
￿
j + 1











(pAB ￿ pAA + pBA ￿ pBB)
￿
< 0
28For any (j;k) term of the series in (29) that is positive, therefore, the corresponding (k;j)
term is negative. This only occurs when k < j , in which case (28) implies that the weight
(pAApBA)
k (pABpBB)
j on the negative term exceeds the weight (pAApBA)
j (pABpBB)
k on the
positive term. Thus the series must be negative.
Given that ￿A ￿ 1￿￿B, suppose next that ￿B < 1
2, so that agents who receive b signals
all vote B. Agents who receive a signals will vote A if they are su¢ ciently well-informed
(i.e. q ￿ ￿A), vote for B if they are su¢ ciently uninformed (i.e. q ￿ 1 ￿ ￿B), and abstain




qdF (q) pBA = F (1 ￿ ￿B) +
Z 1
1￿￿B








These once again imply inequalities (26) through (28), which then imply the following.
~ PA ￿ PB =
1
2

















































The result that ~ PA ￿ PB is equivalent to ￿B ￿ 1
2; thus in equilibrium it cannot be that
￿B < 1
2 or, by a symmetric argument, that ￿A < 1
2.
Lemmas A1 and A2 are useful in preparation for the proof of Theorem 4.
Lemma A1 If TBR (T) ￿ T then T 0
BR (T) ￿ 0.
Proof. The computation of T 0
BR is rather involved since TBR depends on P and ~ P, and
therefore on ￿0, ￿1, ￿￿1, p+, and p￿, as well as the simplifying notation  k de￿ned in (7).
29Di⁄erentiate each of these component parts, as follows:
p
0
+ = ￿Tf (31)
p
0































































































p￿ in (33) and where, for notational convenience, I suppress the argument
T (e.g. writing f instead of f (T)). Note that p0
+ ￿ p0
￿ ￿ 0 and therefore that G ￿ 0.
It is also useful, remembering that ￿1 =
p+
p￿￿0, to de￿ne the ratio ￿ as follows, so that


















30where A1 is de￿ned as follows.
A1 ￿ ￿
0

















































































Without the fraction 1
k+1, the double sum in (41) would equal zero: though  j k (k ￿ j) is
positive whenever k > j, the term with reversed indexes is negative and of equal magnitude.
Dividing by k + 1 places greater weight on negative than positive terms, so the double sum
must be negative; since G is also negative, the sign of A1, and therefore of ￿0, must be
positive.
Writing TBR (T) ￿
~ P
P+ ~ P in terms of ￿ gives the following:
TBR (T) =
1
2 (￿0 + ￿0￿p+)
1
2 (￿0 + ￿0￿p￿) + 1
2 (￿0 + ￿0￿p+)
=
1 + ￿p+
2 + ￿p￿ + ￿p+
(42)









































+ (1 + ￿p￿) ￿ (1 + ￿p+)￿p
0
￿ + ￿




P + ￿ (1 ￿ T)f
2
￿0
~ P + ￿





P + ~ P
￿ 
~ P




0 (p+ ￿ p￿) (43)
The second term of the sum in (43) is positive since ￿0 is positive; when
~ P
P+ ~ P ￿ T, the ￿rst
term is positive as well, so T 0
BR (T) > 0.






. Then the following must be true:
1. If TA > TB then ￿B > TBR (TA) and ￿A < TBR (TB)
2. If TA < TB then ￿B < TBR (TA) and ￿A > TBR (TB)
Proof. Since ￿TA;TB is IPC, the probabilities (2) and (3) of voting correctly and incorrectly

















If TA > TB, it is straightforward to verify that inequalities (26) through (28) hold, as does
the following.22
pAB + pBB > pAA + pBA (48)
In contrast, consider the vote probabilities associated with the signal-symmetric pro￿le
￿TA;TA: pAA and pBB are both equivalent to (44), and pAB and pBA are both equivalent
to (45). Similarly, for ￿TB;TB both pAA and pBB are equivalent to (47) and both pAB
and pBA are equivalent to (46). Using these, I now compare the best response cutpoint
￿B =
~ PA
~ PA+PB under ￿TA;TB and ￿TA;TA. An equivalent condition to ￿B > TBR (TA) is that
~ PA (￿TA;TB)PB (￿TA;TA) > ~ PA (￿TA;TA)PB (￿TA;TB), which I show here must be the case.
22Inequality (48) results from the following:
pAB + pBB ￿ pAA ￿ pBA =
Z 1
qA
















(1 ￿ q)dF (q)
> 0
32Consider the sign of the following di⁄erence.



































































































































The inequality in (50) follows from (48). Whenever j ￿ k, inequalities (27) and (28) imply
that the ￿nal product in (51) is strictly less than one, so that the bracketed di⁄erence is
positive.23 For any negative term, therefore, it must be that j > k; in that case, the
corresponding (k;j) term has otherwise equal magnitude, but receives greater weight (i.e.
(pBApAA)
j (pAApAB)
k instead of (pBApAA)
k (pAApAB)
j). Thus the sign of (49) is positive.
A symmetric derivation reveals that ~ PB (￿TA;TB)PA (￿TB;TB) < ~ PB (￿TB;TB)PA (￿TA;TB)
or, equivalently, that ￿A < TBR (TB), establishing part (i). Part (ii) follows from identical
reasoning, for the case in which TA < TB.
Theorem 4 If ￿￿ is a Bayesian equilibrium then it is SIPC.
Proof. Together, Theorems 1 and 2 imply that ￿￿ must be IPC, with participation thresh-
olds TA = ￿A and TB = ￿B. To show further that it must be signal-symmetric, suppose
















33by way of contradiction that TA > TB (a symmetric argument will apply to the case of
TA < TB). The logic of this proof is to compare the best response thresholds to ￿￿ = ￿TA;TB
with the best responses to the closely-related signal-symmetric strategies ￿TA;TA and ￿TB;TB.
There are three relevant cases to consider:
Case 1: TBR (TB) ￿ TB. By Lemma A2, ￿A < TBR (TB) ￿ TB < TA, so ￿TA;TB is not an
equilibrium.
If TBR (TB) > TB then, since T (￿1;1) = 1
2, there exists (by the Intermediate Value
Theorem) some SIPC equilibrium with a participation threshold strictly above TB. If there
are more than one such equilibria, let T ￿ denote the lowest equilibrium threshold (i.e. the
threshold closest to TB). This threshold distinguishes the remaining two cases. By Lemma
A1, TBR is increasing between TB and T ￿.
Case 2: TBR (TB) > TB and TA ￿ T ￿. Since TBR is increasing between TB and T ￿,
clearly TBR (TB) < T ￿. By Lemma A2, this implies that ￿A < TBR (TB) < T ￿ ￿ TA, so
￿TA;TB is not an equilibrium.
Case 3: TBR (TB) > TB and TA < T ￿. Since TA 2 [TB;T ￿], an interval in which
TBR is increasing, TBR (TA) > TBR (TB). Lemma A2 then implies that ￿B > TBR (TA) >
TBR (TB) > TB, again ensuring that ￿TA;TB is not an equilibrium.





, the best response threshold T
￿
BR (T) is increasing in ￿.
Proof. Vote probabilities p+ and p￿ do not depend on ￿. For a ￿xed threshold T, the
probability  k from (7) that each candidate receives k votes depends only on ￿. The same
is true, therefore, of win and pivot probabilities ￿w, P, and ~ P. Di⁄erentiate  k and ￿w with




























































































From these, di⁄erentiate the ratio
~ P


















where P @ ~ P










































































and similarly ~ P @P




































35The parenthesis term P @ ~ P
@￿ ￿ ~ P @P

















































which is equivalent to the desired result.







BR = L(T), as de￿ned as in (21).





, Myerson (2000) derives the limiting ratio of pivot probabilities as




























1 ￿ M (T)









be a sequence of equilibrium participation thresholds for a se-
quence ￿k of population parameters such that ￿k ! 1 as k ! 1, and let T ￿







. Then T ￿
1 < 1.
Proof. For every ￿k, T ￿




BR converges pointwise to
L, a limit point of T ￿
￿k must therefore be a ￿xed point of L. Solving (21) for M (T), it can
easily be shown that L(T) is greater than, equal to, or less than T if and only if M (T) is
(respectively) greater than, equal to, or less than ￿(T) ￿ T2







2 to ￿(1) = 1, and is strictly concave, as illustrated in Figure 4. The slope of








T 2 + (1 ￿ T)
2￿
￿ T 2 [2T ￿ 2(1 ￿ T)]
￿
T 2 + (1 ￿ T)
2￿2 (57)
=















Figure 4: T=L(T) is a ￿xed point of the limiting best response function if and only if
M(T)=Gamma(T)
Like ￿, M also increases to M (1) = 1. The slope of M, however, approaches 1
2. This
can be seen as follows using the quotient rule, remembering that
dp+
dT = ￿Tf, as in equation
(31) in the proof of Proposition A1. Though I suppress the notation, p+, f, F, M, and the
hazard function, or failure rate h =
f
1￿F, are evaluated at T.
M
0 (T) =











= h[M (T) ￿ T] (58)
Case 1: limT!1 f (T) < 1. As T ! 1, the di⁄erence M (T) ￿ T approaches zero.
The condition that limT!1 f (T) < 1 implies that f (M ￿ T) also converges to zero, so by




0 (T) = lim
T!1








[M (T) ￿ T] ￿ M
0 (T) + 1
￿











[M (T) ￿ T]
Since f is a density function (and must integrate to one) it must be that limT!1
f0
f < 1,
and so the second term of this di⁄erence goes to zero, leaving limT!1 M0 (T) = 1
2.
























Since f is a density function limT!1
f0
f < 1, and the condition that limT!1 f (T) = 1
implies that 1






















0 (T) = lim
T!1
M0 (T) ￿ 1
￿h0=h2




which implies limT!1 M0 (T) = 1
2.
Thus ￿0 (T) ! 0 but M0 (T) ! 1
2; for T su¢ ciently close to one, therefore, M (T) < ￿(T)
or, equivalently, L(T) < T. If it were the case that T ￿
￿k ! 1, there would be a k su¢ ciently


















. This cannot be,
however, since L is an upper bound on T
￿
BR.
Theorem 7 If f is log-concave then L has a unique ￿xed point between 1
2 and 1.
Proof. Existence of a ￿xed point between 1
2 and 1 follows from the Intermediate Value






2 but, as shown in the proof of Theorem 6,
M0 (T) > 0 for T su¢ ciently close to 1, which implies that L(T) < T. To see uniqueness,
it is useful ￿rst to review two useful implications of the log-concavity of f, demonstrated by
Bagnoli and Bergstrom (2005):
￿ (P1)
f0
f is monotonically decreasing.
￿ (P2) The hazard function h =
f
1￿F is monotonically increasing.
38￿ (P3) The mean residual lifetime function
R 1
T (q ￿ T)dF (q) = M (T) ￿ T is monotoni-
cally decreasing or, equivalently, M0 (T) < 1.
P1 implies that limT!1
f0
f < 1, and guarantees the existence of a maximizer ^ T, such that









. In what follows, Step 1 shows that if





















Step 1. For this step, I ￿rst show that M0 (T) ￿ 1
2 when T > ^ T. To see this, ￿rst
di⁄erentiate (58) to obtain the second derivative of M:
M
00 (T) = h































where the second equality follows from (59) and the third follows from (58). M is convex if









For T ￿ ^ T, the right hand side of (61) is greater than 1
2 because f0 is negative. If it were
the case for " > 0 at any T ￿ ^ T that M0 (T) = 1
2 ￿ ", therefore, then M must be concave,
implying that M0 (T) decreases further as T increases, so that limT!1 M0 (T) is bounded
above by 1
2 ￿ ". This contradicts the result from the proof of Theorem 6, however, that
limT!1 M0 (T) = 1
2; thus, for T ￿ ^ T it must be that M0 (T) ￿ 1
2.
The importance of the result that M0 (T) ￿ 1
2 is illustrated in Figure 4: M must lie
between the dotted lines of slopes 1 and 1
2, and therefore cannot intersect ￿ to the right of
391 p
2 (which is the point at which ￿ intersects the dotted line with slope 1
2).24 To the left of
1 p
2, however, the slope of ￿ exceeds 1; since log-concavity (P3) implies M0 (T) < 1 for all T,
M and ￿ can intersect only once in this region. Thus, if M intersects ￿ at a point T ￿ > ^ T
then T ￿ < 1 p
2, and T ￿ must be the unique intersection point of M and ￿, and therefore the
unique ￿xed point of L.





, f0 must be positive, which implies that the right hand
side of (61) is less than 1
2. M must be convex in this interval, because if (61) fails then
M0 (T) = 1
2 ￿ " for some " > 0. This cannot be, however, since then as T increases
concavity would imply that M0 decreases, while (P1) and (P2) together imply that the right
hand side of (61) increases. Thus M would continue concave until T reaches 1, and M0
would be bounded above by 1
2 ￿ ", contradicting the result from the proof of Theorem 6,
that limT!1 M0 (T) = 1





and ￿ is strictly concave, there can
be only one intersection point in this interval.
Lemma 2 Let F and G be continuous, log-concave distributions with strictly positive densi-
ties, and let T F
1 and T G
1 and MF and MG denote the unique limiting participation thresholds
and mean quality functions for F and G, respectively. Then T G
1 > T F
1 if and only if
















Proof. The ￿xed points T F
1 and T G
1 of LF and LG are such that LF (T) > T and LG (T) > T
for any threshold T below T F
1 and T G
1, respectively, and similarly LF (T) < T and LG (T) < T
for any T above T F
1 and T G
1. Clearly, then, T G
1 > T F
1 if and only if LG (T) > LF (T) for






. As is made clear by equation (21), LG (T) > LF (T) if and
24This point is determined algebraically as follows:
T2





2T2 = T2 (1 + T) + (1 ￿ T)
2 (1 + T)
T2 (1 ￿ T) = (1 ￿ T)
￿
1 ￿ T2￿



















Theorem 8 Let F and G be continuous, log-concave distributions with strictly positive den-
sities, and suppose G ￿1 F. Then the following must be true:
1. If G(q) = F (q) for all q ￿ T F
1 then T G
1 = T F











2. If G(q) = F (q) for all q ￿ T F
1 then T G
1 ￿ T F







































Proof. 1. If G(q) = F (q) for all q ￿ T F
1 then the left and right hand sides of (22) are both
equal to one, and it follows immediately that T G
1 = T F











2. G ￿1 F implies that the right hand side of (22) is strictly less than one, but that the










. This implies that T G










































































































































1 < T F



























Theorem 9 Let F and G be continuous, log-concave distributions with strictly positive den-
sities and a common mean m, such that G ￿2 F and T F
1 ￿ m. Then T G













41Proof. Since F and G have a common mean, G ￿2 F implies that the variance of Q is
smaller under G than under F. With T F











and so the left hand side of (22) is less than one for T = T F
1. The right-hand side of (22)
can be rewritten as R 1






1=2 ￿ F (q)dq ￿
R T
1=2 ￿ F (q)dq
R 1
1=2 ￿ G(q)dq ￿
R T
1=2 ￿ G(q)dq
where the numerator and denominator contain equivalent expressions for the common mean
R 1
1=2 ￿ F (q)dq =
R 1
1=2 ￿ G(q)dq = m. By de￿nition, G ￿2 F implies
R T
1=2 ￿ G(q)dq ￿
R T
1=2 ￿ F (q)dq;
since the left-hand side is less than one and the right-hand side is greater than one, the
inequality in (22) does not hold, implying that T G
1 ￿ T F





















, implies ￿ G
￿
T G
1
￿
￿ ￿ F
￿
T F
1
￿
.
42